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Residual Categories and Disciplinary Knowledge: 
Personal Identity in Sociological and 
Forensic Investigations
Robin Williams
University of Durham
A central feature of the development of sociological knowledge is the
formulation and use of “descriptive frames of reference” within which
theoretical and empirical work may be critically assessed. This article
considers the way in which one such frame of reference—that developed
by Erving Goffman to represent the variety of human science understand-
ings of the nature of identity in social interaction—distinguished between
“personal,” “social,” and “self” identity. The relative neglect of the ﬁrst of
these three categorizations is noted. Following Garﬁnkel’s suggestions for
the “respeciﬁcation” of social analysis, this article suggests the usefulness
of an approach to the neglected issue of personal identity that suspends
theoretical stipulation about an abstract noun in favor of an ethnographic
study of a particular occupational group—forensic investigators—for whom
an orientation to personal identities is a recurrent accountable practical
concern.
In his ambitious study of social theory Parsons (1949) argued that the successful de-
velopment of disciplinary knowledge is based not simply on the collection of “facts”
capable of testing the validity of speciﬁc propositions but also on the essential selec-
tivity of the theoretical systems and conceptual schemes necessary to shape, direct,
and limit the range of empirical inquiry. This selectivity distinguishes between what
is and what is not relevant to the system in question and provides encouragement to
further conceptual development within whatever boundaries practitioners draw
and police. This selectivity is visible in the repertoire of categories that gives sub-
stance to the system in question, and the way that categories are represented within
it marks their level of relevance to its intended disciplinary objectives:
Every system, both including its theoretical propositions and its main relevant
empirical insights, may be visualized as an illuminated spot enveloped by dark-
ness. . . . The point is, what lies outside the spot is not really “seen” until the
516 Symbolic Interaction Volume 26, Number 4, 2003
searchlight moves, and then only what lies within the area into which its beam is
newly cast. The logical name for the darkness is, in general, “residual categories.”
(Parsons 1949:16–17)
Parsons is deliberately vague in his usage of the terms “theoretical systems” and
“conceptual schemes,” and even when he promises a more detailed treatment, he
only offers what he describes as a “preliminary, tentative” typology of such
schemes. However, he makes some useful remarks about the most fundamental of
these, which he calls “descriptive frames of reference.” He describes such descrip-
tive frames of reference as “modes of general relations of the facts implicit in the
descriptive terms employed” (Parsons 1949:28). For him, they constitute necessary
schema for selective provision and ordering of empirical facts. They also make pos-
sible identiﬁcations and deﬁnitions of the phenomenon to be explained, and guide
the evaluation of the signiﬁcance of any subsequent statements of “explanatory
value.”
Parsons argues that although such frames of reference vary in their explicitness
and scope, disciplined inquiry is impossible without using them. The history of so-
ciological theory and research includes many such schemes. Since Parsons sought to
build an exceptionally powerful and explicit frame of reference as his contribution
to the development of sociological theory (the “schema of action”), he only pro-
vides examples of those with long-lasting heuristic value, such as the “spatiotemporal
framework” of classical physics and orthodox “supply and demand” theory in eco-
nomics. In fact, the history of sociological analysis is largely a record of the intro-
duction, development, and application of a bewildering variety of such schemes at a
number of theoretical levels, most of which have not been sustained over such long
periods or had such powerful effects as those of Parsons.
But whatever their longevity, the necessary commitment to the development of
such theoretical schemes requires the willingness of their proponents to accumulate
conceptual and empirical work guided by the “positive categories” within them.
Moreover, this commitment also serves to exclude from interest whatever catego-
ries proponents have assigned to the inevitable residuum that the selectivity of the
schemes imply. Insofar as residual categories constitute the “deliberately unexam-
ined” in the construction and use of theoretical frames of reference, it (almost) goes
without saying that a decision to illuminate such twilight areas of scholarly disci-
plines itself promises heuristic advancement, even while threatening disciplinary
closure: “The process of carving out positive concepts from residual categories is
also a process by which the reconstruction of theoretical systems is accomplished as
a result of which they may eventually be altered beyond all recognition” (Parsons
1949:19).
In this article, I illustrate the way theoretical or empirical studies may facilitate
the examination of the content and status of such residual categories and, further,
suggest that such instances provide interesting possibilities for the development of
sociological knowledge.
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IDENTITY: A FRAME OF REFERENCE AND ITS RESIDUUM
Parsons developed his schema as a descriptive frame of reference for all adequate
analysis of the structure of social action. However, Goffman constructed an ambi-
tious, but less explicitly articulated, framework for the analysis of the structure of
social interaction, which he ﬁrst awkwardly described as “conversational inter-
action” as a “species of social order” (Goffman 1953) and, more elegantly, thirty
years later, “the interaction order” (Goffman 1983). Although no single place in
Goffman’s corpus of work deﬁnitively displays this highly abstract frame of refer-
ence, Manning (1992) has provided an excellent reconstruction of what he identi-
ﬁed as the “SIAC schema.” The use of this schema allows Goffman to develop con-
ceptual and empirical inquiries attentive to a number of central principles which, he
argues, constitute the interaction order: “situational propriety,” “involvement,” “ac-
cessibility,” and “civil inattention.”
However, Goffman’s work also contains a large number of other, less encom-
passing conceptual schemata and frames of reference. Some commentators argue
that the accumulation and variability of such schema comprise conceptual proﬂi-
gacy on his part, yet two central concepts consistently articulated within this frame-
work are “self” and “identity.” These closely related terms demarcate a terrain of
interest and suggest ways of more closely examining its contours.1
In the course of his study of “spoiled identity,” Goffman (1968) offered a descrip-
tive frame of reference representing the underlying conceptual orderliness arguably
present across a very large range of human sciences studies that claimed to focus on
“identity.” The timing of this effort may not be accidental. Gleason (1983) has
pointed out that during the period in which Goffman was writing this book—the
early 1960s—a remarkable intensiﬁcation and reorientation of a long-standing in-
tellectual interest in the “problem of identity” occurred. Since their origins in the
rapidly industrializing societies of western Europe in the nineteenth century, a vari-
ety of sociological understandings of identity matters have been derived from and
sought to supplement or supplant several prior accounts of the metaphysics of iden-
tity. The common rationale for these disciplinary developments and innovations ar-
gued for the recognition of the essential and ineradicably social character of the
phenomenon of identity. The details of exactly what scholars meant by reference to
such an essential and ineradicable social character varied. Some found it sufﬁcient
to note the signiﬁcance of the changing social contexts in which generic psychody-
namic processes of identity formation were activated and conditioned. Others em-
phasized that social structures provided a series of templates or positions with pre-
speciﬁed roles, values, and identities, thus locating within the collectivity what had
previously been treated as the product of the self-interrogation of individuals in the
construction of their own identities. Still others asserted that the essentially social
character of identity derived from its origins in linguistic convention, dialogue, or
the dynamics of interaction.
Goffman (1968) comments on this range of conventional meanings and uses of
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the term “identity” while developing his own conceptual framework. He gives
structure to this by adjectival qualiﬁcations of the generic term and thus produces a
trichotomous classiﬁcation comprising “personal identity,” “social identity,” and
“ego (or self) identity.” The following paragraphs outline this framework.
The term “personal identity” refers to that “which distinguishes an individual
from all others” (Goffman 1968:74). Goffman notes that in contemporary society,
this sense of identity normally corresponds to legal identity. In his discussion of
personal identity, he focuses on the variety of ways that each individual may be
said to have a set of unique characteristics. This set of characteristics constitutes
such an identity for them. According to Goffman, two ideas come together in how
we think about this. He describes the ﬁrst as the “positive mark” or “identity peg”
of an individual—the image or trace of this particular person in photographic or
other material or mental records and representations. The second is the unique place
that an individual occupies in a network and history of relationships. In either case,
the notion that the representation or place in some network uniquely identiﬁes only
one person deﬁnes this view of personal identity. For Goffman (1968:74–75), refer-
ence to such personal identity rests on “the assumption that the individual can be
differentiated from all others and that around this means of differentiation a single
continuous record of social facts can be attached, entangled like candy ﬂoss, becom-
ing then the sticky substance to which still other biographical facts can be attached.”
A second usage, “social identity,” reﬂects the availability of “the means of cate-
gorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural
for members of each of these categories” (Goffman 1968:11). He points out that the
attributes that compose any category of social identities will likely be complex and
varied, because they include a wide range of cognitive, attitudinal, personal, and
social features. Given his interactionist focus, these social identities are largely of
interest to the extent that they provide ordinary actors with templates for the orga-
nization and understanding of one another’s conduct in speciﬁc social settings. They
are both anticipations and “righteously presented demands” deployed when people
interact with others. In addition, however, this sense of identity has relevance for
wider social circumstances: the content of such social identity categories guide what
is assumed to be true of members of the relevant category as well as what may be
expected of them in a variety of social and discursive contexts. People frequently
speak and write of a “common identity,” of a kind of sameness between some “kinds”
of people. Although references to this commonality may seem to contradict the no-
tion that identity needs to carry some sense of uniqueness or fundamental differ-
ence from others, such a seeming contradiction does not appear to invalidate either
or both of these standard uses. Certainly, an interest in the continuity of identity
across persons rather than across time and place for one person has led to recent
concerns with the “politics of identity.” Ever since Marx’s discussion of “classes-for-
themselves,” serious problems have arisen about assertions concerning the signiﬁ-
cance of “collective actors,” whether the collectivity is deﬁned in a single identity
category (e.g., African Americans, women, English) or in an ever more complex
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combination of such categories. Yet however much the notion of such collective
actors might have been seen as problematic in the human sciences, contemporary
political rhetoric often explicitly or implicitly draws on the rhetorical capacity of
such an idea to mobilize and shape the afﬁliations of individuals and groups.
We may think of personal identity as referring to what differentiates each indi-
vidual person from all others and social identity as referring to those—particularly
cultural—attributes that individuals share by virtue of common membership in a
social category. We can distinguish both of these from a third sense of identity that
Goffman argues may be found in lay and professional accounts of individuals and
their conduct. He calls this third usage “ego identity” or “self-identity” (and some-
times “felt” identity), and he deﬁnes it as “the subjective sense of his own situation
and his continuity and character that an individual comes to obtain as a result of his
various social experiences” (Goffman 1968:129). We can distinguish the meaning of
such ego or self-identity from that of personal identity (which is also concerned
with unique singularity) by its character as a subjective accomplishment. In Burns’s
(1992) phrase, self-identity is “felt” rather than ascribed or ascribable. Self-identity,
then, refers to what most of us think about when we think of the deepest and most
enduring features of our unique selves as what we “really are.” No necessary dif-
ference arises between the content of the avowed and ascribed attributes drawn on
in the constitution of self-identities, on the one hand, and personal and social iden-
tities, on the other. The difference, Goffman (1968:130) argues, is that with self-
identity, the individual “exercises important liberties in regard to what he fashions.”
Most important here seems to be the capacity of individuals to choose among a set
of available attributes and a concern with the coherence and consistency discernible
within the variety of characterizations accepted to be true of oneself independent of
time and location.
This trichotomous classiﬁcation seems to capture the wide—and rapidly
expanding—range of existing studies of identity with reasonable exactitude. It
marks both commonalities and differences between and within structuralist and
interactionist approaches to this topic. This fact, however, makes more remarkable
the speed with which scholars reduced the trichotomy to a dichotomy, ﬁrst in
Goffman’s work and later in almost all borrowings and commentaries. They re-
duced it either by collapsing two of the terms into one or by simply neglecting one
of the three. Goffman effected the ﬁrst kind of reduction when he bracketed social
and personal identity together and then contrasted them to ego or self-identity:
Social and personal identity are part, ﬁrst of all, of other persons’ concerns and
deﬁnitions regarding the individual whose identity is in question. . . . On the
other hand, ego identity is ﬁrst of all a subjective, reﬂexive matter that necessar-
ily must be felt by the individual whose identity is at issue. (1968:129–30)
The resulting dichotomy, and tension, between socially ascribed identities and
personally avowed and “felt” identity always reappears in Goffman’s later work
and has provided the focus of subsequent critical commentary. Moreover, we can
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see his preference for this diminished array of concepts as merely one typical in-
stance of how “identity” increasingly came to be used in a wide variety of sociologi-
cal theories as a place holder in the obvious gap that existed between accounts of
social collectivities and accounts of social actions throughout the history of sociology.
Since this gap had always been problematic for the explanatory claims of the disci-
pline, attentiveness to it would result in the comparative neglect of the conception
of personal identity as represented by a set of marks that “distinguishes the per-
son so marked from all other individuals” (Goffman 1968:75). While the social
signiﬁcance of such a conception may be indisputable, its sociological signiﬁcance
was minimized. In this way, then, and despite a plethora of sociological studies of
identity, the ﬁeld of study of the signiﬁcance of “personal” identity and the related
processes of personal identiﬁcation has become poorly cultivated. The category it-
self has become hard to make out since it has appeared only in the shadow-light
typically available for the illumination of such residual categories in sociological
analysis.
Below I suggest that the ﬂexible application of Garﬁnkel’s generic “respeciﬁca-
tion program” to these treatments of identity issues in conventional sociological in-
vestigations provides the opportunity to rescue the category “personal identity”
from this comparative neglect. A recent empirical study of the work of forensic
investigators in one particular English police force illustrates this suggestion.
FROM RESIDUAL CATEGORY TO RESEARCH FOCUS
Garﬁnkel’s (1967) “ethnomethodology” seeks to study the ways in which human
subjects acting in concert with one another produce their own and recognize one
another’s “sensible” and “accountable” embodied actions and utterances. It aims to
provide empirical descriptive studies of what Garﬁnkel (1967:11) calls “naturally
organized ordinary activity.” The production, recognition, and organization of such
ordinary activity constitutes the foundation of social order—what he refers to as the
“locally produced, naturally organized, reﬂexively accountable phenomena of order.”
Scholars routinely describe Garﬁnkel’s program as a “respeciﬁcation” of the human
sciences (Garﬁnkel 1991, 1996; Garﬁnkel and Wieder 1992; Lynch 1993; Lynch and
Bogen 1996). Such a respeciﬁcation treats the classical themes and standard vocab-
ulary of the human sciences as “unexplicated terms” for those locally and naturally
occurring social phenomena that are objects of disciplinary attention. Adopting this
program changes how we understand such objects of study in the human sciences.
In addition, Lynch and Bogen (1996:273) have described such respeciﬁcation as a
procedure in which any human science concept or problem or method is reexam-
ined as a “matter of routine local relevance for a particular kind of practical in-
quiry.” During these reexaminations, we can expect to see how social actors deploy
any such concept, problem, or method in the course of their everyday activity.
Under the banner of “respeciﬁcation,” we are to examine phenomena described
as (for example) the “rules, signs, production, causes, inquiry, evidence, proof,
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knowledge, consciousness, reason, practical action, comparability, uniformity, reli-
ability, validity, objectivity, observability, detail and structure” (Garﬁnkel and Wieder
1992:177). However, we are not to examine these phenomena as philosophical or
theoretical problems requiring professional analytic solution but as “mundanely
and routinely avowed, ascribed and observably presupposed” features of ordinary
social actions. The preferred strategy for such inquiries has been the study of situ-
ated activities in their natural settings in order to observe (and sometimes to gain)
the resources routinely deployed as constitutive of competent membership in such
settings (e.g., Garﬁnkel 1986; Garﬁnkel, Lynch, and Livingston 1981; Livingston
1986; Travers 1977; Travers and Manzo 1997).
Thus the notion of respeciﬁcation encourages a focus on identity matters as an
amalgamation of a range of local, revisable occasioned relevances of social actors. It
promotes the investigation of identity matters as they arise and are dealt with in the
socially organized practices of everyday life. Such investigations, overall, aim to ex-
plicate what is involved in identity matters as they are made available by and to sit-
uated actors in the course of their co-construction of the orderliness of speciﬁc so-
cial contexts—identity not as an attribute of a person but as a “course of treatment”
shaped and deployed by speciﬁc actors in determinate social and organizational
contexts. A number of recent studies of social identity and self-identity—two of
Goffman’s three characterizations of identity—have contributed to the realization
of such an aim (e.g., Eglin and Hester 1992; Hester and Eglin 1997; Watson 1998),
although even here, personal identity seems ignored. Let us turn to a consideration
of one group of such actors and the way in which an accountable orientation to the
topic of identity—especially personal identity—constitutes a central preoccupation
of their working lives.
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
All police forces in the United Kingdom employ staff with speciﬁc responsibility for
the forensic investigation of crime scenes. Depending on the force in question,
these staff have a variety of titles (including scenes of crime ofﬁcers, scientiﬁc sup-
port ofﬁcers, forensic investigators, and crime scene examiners). I refer to them
here as crime scene examiners2 (CSEs) since this term best captures their primary
functions—to search for physical evidence at crime scenes, to determine the poten-
tial value of such evidence, and to secure and store evidence for subsequent analy-
sis. CSEs also interpret the relevance of the evidence to police intelligence and
criminal case construction and in all of these ways contribute to the wider crime
investigation and detection process.
During much of 2000, I conducted an ethnographic study of the work of a group
of ﬁve CSEs stationed in one division of an English Constabulary. I combined par-
ticipant observation of the examination of a large number of domestic burglary
scenes with extensive informal interviewing of CSEs and other police ofﬁcers in-
volved in crime investigation, collection of a range of documentary information
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relating to scene examinations, and attendance at divisional meetings concerned
with crime detection in the area.
Consistent focus on the nature of personal identity and personal identiﬁcation
was a matter of overwhelming occupational priority for this staff group. This orien-
tation is not a matter for theoretical speculation but one of mundane competence
and organizational accountability. The group continually displayed this orientation
in their practical activities at crime scenes, in the paperwork accounting for these ac-
tivities, in their talk to victims during the course of scene examinations, in the work
narratives exchanged among themselves, in the processing of the results of their
crime scene examinations, and in the performance measurements used to assess the
effectiveness of their contributions to organizational objectives. Despite several
studies of the process of criminal investigations (e.g., Ericson 1993; Hobbs 1988;
Manning 1977; Morgan 1990; Sanders 1977) and a developing corpus of studies on
the representation of forensic evidence and expertise in judicial settings (e.g.,
Jasanoff 1995; Lynch 1998; Lynch and Jasanoff 1998), the practice of crime scene
examination has not previously been the subject of detailed sociological inquiry.
CSEs structure the overall process of scene examinations by trying to create a
cognitive reconstruction of the sequence of events that occurred during each bur-
glary under investigation. They achieved this cognitive reconstruction by interpret-
ing a variety of material signs of movement and activity at the scenes as well as an
accumulated knowledge of a repertoire of typiﬁed and standardized burglary
modus operandii as part of their accumulated background knowledge of burglaries.
An orientation to such a reconstructive process has long been referred to in texts on
criminal investigation (e.g, Kind 1987; Nickell and Fischer 1999; White 1999), since
Edmund Locard wrote of “re-creating” the criminal from traces left. However, the
seemingly intuitive and fugitive nature of the process has meant that it has usually
been a resource for instruction rather the topic of empirical research.
CSEs themselves formulated it only in the most general way: as a matter of accu-
mulated professional expertise. They recognized the likely imprecision of their re-
construction while arguing for its usefulness in shaping and focusing each examina-
tion by reducing what would otherwise be its almost indeﬁnite scope. This reductive
use is especially important since CSEs have constantly to make fateful judgments
about the efforts made to search particular scenes in light of their knowledge of
scarce resources, the range of alternative demands on their time, and their concern
with the measurement of their work effort by the use of a restricted range of perfor-
mance indicators. These judgments are informed by both prior understandings of
“normal” or “typical” burglary scenes and the constant comparison of such a priori
expectations with the emerging details of the particular scene in question. These
CSEs were sensitive to the need for both the deployment of some such preliminary
framework for the organization of their approach to the scene and the willingness
to suspend, enhance, or modify its use by the close observation and registration of
the speciﬁc details of each unique scene visited. CSEs sought in their own work and
valued in others’ work an ability to deploy an intelligent and methodical process
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that avoided the dogged application of a preconceived expectation of the nature of
the scene and facilitated the ﬂexible use of their unique professional skills.
The CSEs’ orientation to an essentially reconstructive impulse remains pre-
served in both their photographic records and in the notes they make in the course
of the scene examination. CSEs use professional judgment to determine the exten-
siveness and intensiveness of a photographic record, along with a projected assess-
ment of its value—largely for evidential or expository purposes. It can of course be
argued that all those involved in the process of investigating crime are informed by
a similar combination of retrospective gaze and projective orientation. However,
the CSEs’ contribution is distinguished by how these considerations are continu-
ously reformulated and redirected through the discovery, contextual interpretation
and collection of physical evidence in and through the course of a technologically
enhanced examination of the crime scene. For CSEs, then, emergent reconstructive
accounts are measured against, developed alongside, and revised through the de-
tailed collection and documentation of physical evidence.
In the case of the burglary examinations, a limited number of such types of phys-
ical evidence regularly appeared. These included footwear marks and impressions,
ﬁbers from clothing found at points of entry to the burglary, tool marks left on
doors or windows that had been forced open, broken glass, and paint fragments
where the suspect had damaged paintwork on entry, ﬁngermarks, body ﬂuids, and
tissue suitable for DNA proﬁling.
These forms of physical evidence vary in the strength of their contribution to
crime detection and prosecution. The usefulness of many of them depended on fea-
tures of their precise location as well as their relationship to other forms of informa-
tion available in the wider police investigatory context in which they could be inter-
preted. However, CSEs always treated ﬁngerprints and body ﬂuids and tissue as
especially valuable to the investigation of crime, because they were the only forms
of evidence recognized as capable of capturing the personal identity of suspects. For
this reason, CSEs devoted the greatest attention in the course of their examinations
of burglary scenes to the discovery and recovery of these evidential traces of per-
sonal identity. However, the practical activities involved in the discovery and collec-
tion of these two forms of forensic evidence drew on different technologies and fol-
lowed different trajectories.
CSEs usually made the initial identiﬁcation of ﬁngerprints relevant for and capa-
ble of further examination at burglary scenes by using available light or by deploy-
ing oblique lighting. Examiners had specialist light sources available, but their use
raised health and safety issues. Thus examiners did not normally use them, except
when searching scenes where more serious crimes had been committed. Following
the initial observations of potentially valuable ﬁngerprints, CSEs typically began
more detailed work by brushing powder very lightly over particular areas of (or ob-
jects in) the scene to establish the quality of any potentially recoverable marks. Once
such marks became visible, CSEs identiﬁed their contours so that they could brush
along the contours of the ridges without ﬁlling in or erasing them. This technique
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results in powder becoming ﬁxed to the oily ridge deposits, with the success of the
technique depending on the condition of the original mark, the right choice of ﬁn-
gerprint powder, and the skilled application of that powder by the examiner.
Throughout this process, the examiners prospectively oriented to what they
knew ﬁngerprint analysts would require for matching a fragmentary mark at the
scene to a ﬁngerprint record of a suspect in the relevant database. The CSE should
not send prints to the bureau that turn out to be unsuitable for matching since that
would signal his or her incompetence. As the print is being developed in situ—or at
the stage where it is photographed or lifted via an adhesive acetated sheet—the ex-
aminer hopes to see ridge detail, or, more precisely in the vocabulary of the ﬁnger-
print world, “second level” ridge detail. “First level” ridge detail refers to the over-
all patterns repeated across all ﬁngerprints, and while such detail is relevant for the
cataloging of ﬁngerprints (and some patterns are more rare than others) they do
not have individualizing value.
Second-level detail is made visible by attending to speciﬁc points in the paths
taken by the friction ridges of the ﬁngerprint. CSEs sometimes refer to such points
as Galton details, following the work of Francis Galton, and ﬁngerprint examiners
have developed a vocabulary of terms to designate different kinds of such points,
for example, “ridge endings,” “bifurcations,” “lakes,” “dots,” “overlapping ridges.”
Second-level detail is required for individuation, and CSEs search for this detail as
they develop a mark and decide whether it is worth keeping and submitting to spe-
cialist examiners.3
DNA collection is a less complex process. It requires limited skills and can be
easily converted into a simple protocol. What matters most in collecting DNA evi-
dence are the methods of releasing the biological sample from the object on which
it is found and of avoiding contamination of the suspect crime scene DNA source
by other DNA deriving from a different human subject. To collect a potential DNA
crime scene stain—for example, a possible bloodstain on the sharp edge of a drawer
that a burglar seems to have pulled from a chest of drawers and left on the ﬂoor—
CSEs carry out a few simple actions. The method consists of using three swabs
moistened with sterile water: the ﬁrst is used to lift the biological material from the
relevant surface, the second is used to sample material at some nominal distance
from the biological material, and the third is simply moistened and then retained
otherwise unused. The second and third swabs serve as controls by collecting any
relevant contaminants; the examiners hope that the ﬁrst swab contains the neces-
sary DNA to proﬁle a suspect stain.
The contingencies that surround the collection of DNA evidence differ from
those that apply to ﬁngerprint collection. CSEs must identify the potential stain in
the ﬁrst place. A CSE needs to be reasonably sure that the stain is of human origin
and potentially relevant to the crime. Depending on the surface on which the stain
is found, CSEs may have to cut away the material and send it directly to the labora-
tory instead of swabbing it. Moreover, all of these possibilities have to be deter-
mined in the course of a once-and-only examination, since the bulk of this kind of
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crime scene examination can only take place in a relatively short time before the
presence and actions of others contaminate the scene.
The practical mastery of these—and other—trace evidence collection techniques
comprises a dominant element in the routine work of crime scene examiners. In the
case of ﬁngerprint collection, unlike DNA collection, crime scene examiners deal
with the construction of a complex artifact that demands constant visual attention
and manual dexterity throughout the course of its construction. Moreover, CSEs in-
form their visual attention by knowledge of what is required to establish an even-
tual match between the scene artifact and an available—or potential—ﬁngerprint
record. Scene examination requires constant decision making about what work is
worth doing with a variety of contact trace materials discovered at a variety of
crime scenes. The amount of work involved here can vary signiﬁcantly but usually
involves the creation of artifacts that others will later treat as the equivalent of—or
as stand-ins for—the real-world objects from which these artifacts (the scanned ﬁn-
gerprint lift or the DNA electoropherogram, for example) were constructed.
The individualizing logic of criminalistic practice underpins decisions to pursue
these and many more kinds of work, and the currently available repertoire of col-
lection techniques and individual examiners’ skills locally conditions them. These
decisions are also accountably oriented to a number of other cognitive presupposi-
tions concerning the organizational routines and practical contingencies typical of
the conduct of criminal investigations and prosecutions. In this overall context, un-
derstandings of the nature of personal identity and identiﬁcation are activated in
crime scene examinations and are also displayed, contested, and negotiated in sub-
sequent stages in the criminal justice process.
One of the most interesting features of the long history of criminalistic practice is
the intensity of its pragmatic concern with the parameters of what I have referred to
throughout this article as the residual category of personal identity. Other commen-
tators (e.g., Sekula 1986; Valier 1998) have observed that exactly this feature of
criminalistics marks its departure from the seemingly related discipline of criminol-
ogy, whose focus has been more generic than individualizing, more theoretical than
technical. A range of accounts describe the emergence and application of forensic
identiﬁcation technologies in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the ﬁrst
quarter of the twentieth (e.g., Caplan and Torpey 2001; Ginzburg 1980, 1990; Joseph
and Winter 1996; Torpey 1998). Conventionally, these studies suggest that the iden-
tiﬁcation of recidivist criminals (especially in quickly growing urban centers) be-
came a cause for state concern from the mid-nineteenth century. Criminalists gen-
erally agree that the recognition of previously convicted criminals would serve to
reduce their dangerousness, and they supported a number of technological initia-
tives, including the police use of photography, anthropometric measurement, and
ﬁngerprinting.
The development of such individuating criminalistic technologies has been subject
to a series of uncertainties. In particular, the question arises, how many similarities
between an object and its impression or traces are necessary to establish conﬁdence
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in its individualization? The history of both ﬁngerprint and DNA identiﬁcations re-
veals a series of changes in the answers given to this question (see, e.g., Balding
1999; Balding and Donelly 1995; Evett and Weir 1998; Evett and Williams 1995;
Weir 1998). In addition, criminalists make important differences in their assump-
tions about the use of these two technologies for the collection and analysis of the
material correlates of personal identity. Although they may understand ﬁngerprints
to signify the surface uniqueness of personal identity, they think DNA represents
the body’s interior uniqueness. Whereas the former implies no more than adventi-
tious superﬁcial dissimilarity between individuals, the latter is often portrayed as
constituting the fundamental basis of both physiological and psychological proper-
ties of personal identity.4 Cole (2001) points out that the development of individu-
ating forensic identiﬁcation has always involved assumptions about the behavioral
diagnostics potentially available through examining such features. Often, these as-
sumptions have turned out to be unfounded. Interestingly, however, the CSEs
treated these assumptions as irrelevant speculations. The longevity and stability of
these individualizing features and their traces, along with the probability of their
discovery at particular crime scene, mattered more to them. In this respect, they
treated both ﬁngerprints and DNA traces as “empty signiﬁers,” in Cole’s phrase.
CONCLUSION
The long history and extensive variety of philosophical speculations and human sci-
ences studies of identity matters bears witness to the theoretical signiﬁcance attrib-
uted to the idea of identity. However, its representation in these specialist discourses
does not capture its generic signiﬁcance or how it is embedded in the ordinary activi-
ties and practical ways in which people accomplish joint actions. The work of
Garﬁnkel and others challenges attempts to provide general and speculative theo-
ries that assert what identity is or is not and allow a casual treatment of the relation-
ship of such theories to the understandings, actions, and events they claim to de-
scribe, illuminate, or explain. I encourage adopting an alternative proposal—that
we should look at identity matters as they arise and are addressed in the course of
ordinary actions. Identity may well be an inescapable feature of human existence,
but we can understand why and how this is so much more successfully through ex-
amining local knowledge and practical action than we can by seeking to specify,
modify, or correct schematic theories of its essential features.
In this article I have taken particular interest in how one summary of sociological
thinking about identity both reﬂected and contributed to the residualization of one
of the three elements included in this descriptive framework. I have suggested that
this residuum can be illuminated by reference to an orientation to personal identity
easily observable in the organized practices and local contexts of the work of crime
scene examiners as they search for contact trace material at the sites of domestic
burglaries. Knowledge of the material correlates and traces of personal identity
along with the mastery of current technologies for their capture, classiﬁcation, and
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storage provide essential resources for the work of these examiners. The application
of this knowledge and these technologies together serve to constitute personal
identity as the object of forensic investigation. This not only reﬂects wider under-
standings of the material correlates of identity but also contributes to the changing
constellation of such understandings. For this reason, it seems likely that anyone
seeking a contemporary illustration of Goffman’s “marks of identity” is more likely
to choose the DNA proﬁle than his own earlier choice of the ﬁngerprint.
Writing about a different but related issue, Smith (1996:194) commented that we
should replace those sociological approaches “which give primacy to theory and
whose phenomenal universe is constituted by abstractions” with one that “aims at
knowing the social as people actually bring it into being. Its objects would not be
meanings but the actual ongoing ways in which peoples activities are co-ordinated.”
I believe this is true. If we cannot establish the connection between human science
abstraction and the mundane world, which such abstractions seek to interpret, then
the function of such abstraction remains questionable. If we see any proposed
human science understanding of identity as responsive to what matters to individu-
als at all (and I cannot conceive of any useful human science understanding that
could ignore this requirement), then we must describe how identity matters to them
in the local contexts of their everyday lives.
NOTES
1. There is not space here to document the history of commentary on this work. Studies by Man-
ning (esp. 1992, 2000) and Burns (1992) make major contributions of their own as well as pro-
vide guides to the work of others.
2. In the United States, such individuals are more often referred to as crime scene investigators.
3. More detail of the exigencies of ﬁngerprint matching and the use of such evidence can be found
in Cole’s (2001) excellent study of the history of this technology.
4. A recent report of the U.K. Human Genetics Commission (2002) included a section on the fo-
rensic uses of DNA. The commission argued that DNA is a more reliable informant than ﬁn-
germarks since it is durable, can be ampliﬁed from minute amounts, and is recoverable from
almost every human cell or tissue, unlike ﬁngerprints, genetic information is shared with
biological relatives, and that DNA is more “information rich” than ﬁngerprints.
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